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In this paper I examine how the protection of creditors' rights influence the way in which 
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protection of creditor rights foreign bank entry may benefit all firms; By contrast, in countries 
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1  Introduction 
In the late 1990s many developing countries opened up their financial sectors to 
foreign bank entry. Advocates of liberalisation prognosticated more stable and deeper 
financial systems thanks to technological transfers, access to better know-how and 
increased competition. Detractors, pointed at the possibility of cream skimming by 
foreign banks and, as a consequence, at a possible credit rationing of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). The financial stability enjoyed by most countries in the 
last decade has largely given right to financial liberalisation advocates. The jury is still 
out, however, with respect to the impact of foreign banks on credit access. More than 
ten years since the first reformers opened up their markets we have now enough data to 
address this issue.  
The possibility that foreign bank entry may lead to credit rationing stems from 
information asymmetries and adverse selection costs. If information is complete, 
foreign bank entry should result in more and cheaper loans as inefficient credit 
providers are replaced by more efficient banks. But if information is costly foreign 
banks may only be able to serve a segment of firms. With market segmentation the net 
impact of foreign bank entry on total credit growth and on credit allocation becomes 
difficult to predict.  
Yet, surprisingly enough, very little is known about the impact of foreign banks in 
countries with poor economic institutions, where information asymmetries can be 
expected to be acute. As growing numbers of developing countries with relatively 
weak economic institutions turn to foreign banks to strengthen their financial sectors, 
understanding the linkages between institutional development and financial 
intermediation is of more than mere theoretical interest.  
This paper contributes to this debate by relating economic institutions to the net impact 
of foreign banks on credit access, using firm-level information in 22 transition  
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economies. In particular, I test whether the interaction between  the protection of 
creditor’s rights and the share of foreign banks in the domestic financial sector has a 
significant effect on the access to and the costs of credit of SMEs. To my knowledge 
this is the first time that this relation is empirically addressed at the firm level.  
I find that in transition countries foreign bank entry has resulted in more, rather than in 
fewer, credit constraints for the average firm. Rather than benefiting the majority of 
firms, as has apparently been the case in middle income countries, in transition 
economies only the most transparent firms, i.e. firms that use international accounting 
standards, benefit from foreign bank entry.  
The negative impact of foreign banks on the vast majority of firms in this sample  is 
associated to weaknesses in the bankruptcy systems of transition countries. As 
bankruptcy proceedings become lengthier and more expensive, the negative incidence 
of foreign banks on credit conditions increases. These results are robust to controls for 
the possible endogeneity of foreign banks. 
For developing countries these findings hold an important warning. In these countries 
many of the expected benefits of foreign bank entry may not materialise before legal 
reform achieves a certain threshold.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Part two motivates the study and reviews 
the literature on foreign banks and credit access of small firms. Part three presents the 
empirical set up and results. Part four concludes. 
2  Motivation and literature review 
At the theoretical level, a vast body of literature explores the effect of foreign bank 
entry on total credit growth and credit allocation in the presence of information 
asymmetries (see Clarke, G. et. al. 2001b for a comprehensive literature review). The 
main insight of this literature may be summarised as follows: If markets are complete, 
financial liberalisation, by allowing the operation of more efficient banks in the home  
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market, should result in deeper financial sectors and better credit allocation. In the 
presence of information asymmetries, however, this result may no longer hold. If 
foreign banks only have a comparative advantage in serving some borrowers, their 
entry may lead to market segmentation with ambiguous effects on total credit growth 
and credit allocation.  
The literature on information and credit allocation typically distinguishes between two 
types of information (e.g Berger and Udell, 2002 and 2005, Degryse and Ongena, 
2005): Hard information, such as balance sheets that comply with some minimum 
accounting standards, and soft information which refers to information more difficult 
to encode, such as the trustworthiness of potential borrowers. Hard information can be 
presented in standardised ways and therefore travels easily across the different 
organisational layers within a bank, irrespective of the distance between the person 
who gathers this information (the loan officer) and the person that approves the 
transaction (management). The transmission of soft information, by contrasts, requires 
a more involved interaction between loan officers and management and suffers, 
therefore, when the distance between these two instances in the decision-making 
process increases.  
In markets where soft information is needed to sort out clients, small banks enjoy a 
natural advantage over larger and more hierarchical institutions. In the case of foreign 
banks, which also tend to be large and hierarchical firms, and where management and 
loan officers are physically located in different countries, cultural differences make the 
flow of soft information even more difficult. Thus foreign banks can be expected to 
concentrate on those segments of the market where hard information is readily 
available, such as large corporations or the government, and to leave small/opaque 
firms to local lenders. 
.Empirical evidence has shown that, relative to domestic banks, 
foreign bank portfolios do indeed attach more weight to wholesale banking and give 
more credit to large borrowers, leaving local banks to retail banking and to look after 
lending to small firms (see Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000).
.  
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To policy makers this peculiarity of the banking industry poses an important question. 
If it is possible that foreign bank entry has a different impact on firms of different 
types, is it likely to be detrimental to the smaller and less transparent firms? 
Theoretically, a foreign bank bias towards hard information firms does not necessarily 
imply that opaque firms will definitely encounter higher credit constraints after 
liberalisation, as compared with their previous situation. Under certain conditions, 
domestic banks may profitably specialise in serving the more opaque group of firms, 
so that, after liberalisation, this sector may – at least – not be worse off than before. 
Allowing for technical spillovers and an increase in competition among domestic 
banks for these borrowers, access to credit may even improve.  
Under which circumstances can good but opaque firms be expected to gain or lose 
from foreign bank entry? In a recent contribution to this debate, Detragiache E., P. 
Gupta and Th. Tressel(2006) offer a model that shows that, when adverse selection 
costs and the costs of monitoring soft information firms are sufficiently large relative 
to the return from projects, foreign bank entry can lead to less total lending, as opaque 
firms are completely left out of the financial circuit.  
In this set up, two banks, a foreign and a domestic bank with two different monitoring 
technologies, compete for borrowers. The costs of monitoring hard information are 
lower for the foreign bank, whereas the domestic bank has a competitive advantage in 
monitoring soft information firms. The comparative advantage of the foreign bank in 
monitoring hard information allows it to offer lower interest rates to firms that can 
provide this type of information which, therefore, sort themselves out. Once the 
foreign bank has won all good hard information projects the domestic bank is left with 
a new pool that encompasses all soft information projects plus all bad projects rejected 
by the foreign bank.  
If before foreign bank entry the domestic bank was pooling all projects and lending at 
a rate rp, foreign bank entry will alter lending rates to opaque firms in one of three 
possible ways:   
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1)  If the costs of monitoring soft information are high relative to the costs of 
adverse selection (the costs to good opaque projects of being pooled with bad 
projects) the domestic bank will pool together bad projects and good but 
opaque projects and continue financing albeit at a rate rp* > rp .  
2)  If the costs of monitoring soft information are lower than the costs of adverse 
selection the domestic bank will separate good opaque projects and finance 
them at a rate rs =1+Cs such that  rp* > rs > rp where Cs is the domestic bank's 
cost of monitoring soft information. Bad projects will not be financed.  
3)  If the costs of monitoring soft information and the costs of adverse selection are 
very high the domestic bank will stop all lending and credit rationing will 
ensue. 
If the domestic bank was separating hard and soft information projects before foreign 
bank entry will only affect hard information firms which will face lower rates.  
Thus in this set up only hard information firms can benefit from foreign bank entry 
whereas soft information firms can never be better off: For soft information firms the 
impact of foreign banks can only run from irrelevant, if a separated equilibrium existed 
before foreign bank entry, to credit rationing if adverse selection and monitoring costs 
are very high
1.  
In this model differences in monitoring techniques are responsible for different 
allocation impacts. Foreign banks from industrial nations that go into other industrial 
countries do not generate credit rationing because there is a small distance between the 
monitoring techniques of banks from countries with similar levels of economic 
development. The wedge appears when banks from industrial countries enter 
                                          
1 Anther possible and related way for foreign banks to affect the access to credit pf opaque firms is 
through the destruction of relationship lending. In the case of transition economies I expect this channel 
to be of minor importance, since few relationships could have been destroyed by the time foreign banks 
were allowed to enter. See on this Giannetti and Ongena (forthcoming).    
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developing markets and compete for borrowers with very different domestic banks. By 
extension, it may also be said that the net impact of foreign bank entry on credit access 
depends on the economic institutions that determine moral hazard and adverse 
selection costs and the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers in host countries. 
Hence in countries with loose accounting standards, poor firm governance, or where 
creditor rights are weakly enforced foreign bank entry would be more likely to result in 
the credit rationing of smaller firms.  
Available empirical evidence on the impact of foreign banks on credit allocation offers 
mixed results. Testing their model predictions on macro data in a sample of low and 
lower middle income countries, Detragiache et.al. (2006) find that poor countries with 
a higher penetration of foreign banks do indeed have shallower banking sectors and 
experience lower credit growth. However, since they work with macro-data the impact 
of foreign banks on credit allocation can only be inferred from total credit growth. 
Examples of case studies that do observe credit allocation effects are Haber and 
Musachio (1994) on Mexico, and Gormley (2005) on India, who provide evidence of a 
worsening in credit conditions for opaque firms following foreign bank entry. 
Although these authors cannot link their results with country level factors, Haber and 
Musachio do suspect that problems related to the effectiveness of bankruptcy laws in 
Mexico may be at the origin of credit rationing.  
However, positive effects of foreign bank entry on credit allocation in developing 
countries have also been reported. Two cross country studies on middle income 
countries (Clarke, G. et. al. 2001a, and Giannetti and Ongena, forthcoming) find that in 
these countries foreign bank entry enhances credit access for all firms, even if smaller 
firms benefit less than larger ones. In the same vein Bonin and Abel (2000) find, in a 
case study of Hungary, that in this country foreign bank entry did increase retail 
lending, both directly and indirectly, by forcing the major local bank to improve its 
retail banking services.   
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More nuanced results are found by de Haas (2005) who shows increasing levels of 
leverage for small firms between 1996 and 2001 in countries such as Estonia, Hungary 
or Latvia, but the opposite in the case of Poland, Bulgaria, and in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics where leverage fell following liberalisation. Finally Bonin (2004) finds that 
foreign bank entry is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for effective financial 
intermediation in Southeast Europe. 
How to reconcile these contradictory results? My conjecture, based on the above 
discussion, is that differences in the protection of creditor's rights in host countries are 
associated to different effects of foreign bank entry on credit allocation. The protection 
of creditor rights is one of the economic institutions with the highest bearing on 
adverse selection costs. When creditor rights are poorly protected, entrepreneurs that 
do not exert effort can expect to go unpunished and moral hazard and adverse selection 
costs rise. As moral hazard and adverse selection costs rise so does the likelihood that 
foreign bank entry leads to credit rationing of opaque firms. Conversely, in countries 
with better protection of creditor rights and, consequently, lower adverse selection 
costs, small and opaque firms are more likely to be served by domestic banks with 
little or no negative impact of foreign bank entry. The forces driving these results are 
twofold: First, the foreign bank bias against small/opaque firms will be greater in 
countries where risky lending is particularly costly. Second, in these countries the 
moral hazard attached to the pool of projects not served by foreign banks will also be 
larger. In these conditions domestic banks willing to serve opaque clients will only be 
able to do it at significantly higher interest rates, if at all. 
This paper tests this hypothesis relating institutions to the net impact of foreign banks 
on credit access using information on institutional development and credit access of 
firms in transition economies. To my knowledge, this is the first time that this relation 
is empirically tested. 
Based on this discussion I set to answer these two related questions:  
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1.  Are small/opaque firms in transition countries more credit constrained as 
foreign bank ownership increases?  
2.  Does the net impact of foreign bank ownership on access to credit depend on 
host countries' institutional development?    
3  Empirical setup  
3.1  Sample  
The source for the firm-level data is the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005. BEEPS was designed to analyse 
the quality of governance and the investment climate from a firm-level perspective for 
the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For the purpose of the 
present study, BEEPS presents three characteristics that makes it particularly 
attractive. First, BEEPS ensures representation of firms of all sizes in all countries; 
Second, while other data bases rely on information provided by firms that submit 
financial data to local authorities (i.e. hard information firms), firms in the BEEPS 
sample were randomly selected from business directories and yellow pages. These two 
features ensure the inclusion in the sample of small and opaque firms; Third, BEEPS 
includes both firms with and without credit, allowing the direct observation of the 
extent of credit supply constraints.  
This last feature of the data makes this paper especial among other studies of credit in 
transition countries (e.g Gianetti and Ongeny, forthcoming, Bonin 2001 and 2004, or 
de Haas 2005) in that the focus here are the losers rather than winners of economic 
reform. Studies based on samples of firms with credit can tell whether different 
institutions, e.g., different legislation on foreign bank entry, generate –or not- better 
credit conditions for these firms. What they cannot see, but the present study can, is 
whether some firms are left out in the cold as a result of the reform.   
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However it should be noted that, since the data is purely cross-sectional, I cannot 
estimate the impact of foreign banks on credit access over time. Credit rationing can 
arise if foreign banks have difficulties screening borrowers, and local banks cannot 
profitably serve those good projects 'wrongly' rejected by the foreign bank. In that 
sense, foreign bank entry may lead to more credit constraints for opaque firms at an 
initial date but this bias may become less important over time, as foreign banks acquire 
the knowledge they require to process soft information and/or firms upgrade their 
signals. Lacking this time dimension, the terms foreign bank entry, foreign bank 
ownership and foreign bank presence are used interchangeably.  
The sample covers 6.189 firms in the following 22 countries: Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Ukraine.  
3.2  Dependent variables 
BEEPS includes two questions about the impact of credit constraints of firms. The first 
is whether access to commercial credit constitutes an obstacle to growth. The second is 
whether the costs of commercial finance constitute an obstacle to growth. Answers to 
these questions are ordered in an scale of 1 to 4 with 4 signifying that the respective 
constraint is a major obstacle to growth. Based on these indicators I construct two 
dummy dependent variables, access to and cost of credit. These two variables take 
value of one when the corresponding constraint is found to be a major obstacle to 
growth, and zero otherwise.  
In table 1 both indicators of credit constraints are related to two proxies of firm opacity 
and to bank ownership. The indicators of firm opacity are size, a traditional proxy of 
opacity, and a narrower indicator of opacity which distinguishes between firms with 
and without international accounting standards. Small firms, expected to rely more on 
soft information than larger firms, are defined, as usual, as firms of less than 50  
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employees. With the narrower indicator only firms that use international accounting 
standards, irrespective of their size, are considered transparent, i.e. only firms with 
international accounting standards are expected to pass hard information to banks. 
Regarding bank ownership the table distinguishes between countries where foreign 
banks dominate (i.e. countries where foreign banks own more than 50% of total 
banking assets) and the rest.  
27% of small firms versus 20% of large firms find that the costs of credit are a major 
obstacle to growth. This is as expected since small firms are generally found to have 
more problems acceding credit than large firms. When the proxy for opacity is the 
narrower definition of 'use of international accounting standards' the difference is even 
more striking: 26% of opaque firms versus 17% of transparent firms find that the cost 
of credit is a major obstacle to growth.  
Results are more interesting however when the sample is split between countries where 
foreign banks dominate and the rest. In the first sub sample 30% of all opaque firms 
versus only 16% of transparent firms find that the costs of credit are a major obstacle 
to growth. Parson chi2 tests show that these difference are significant at the 1% level 
of confidence. Similar (albeit not significant) differences are observed between small 
and large firms: relatively more small firms find that the costs of credit are a major 
obstacle to growth in countries where foreign banks dominate while the opposite is 
true for larger firms. Interestingly in terms of access to credit foreign banks seem to 
punish opaque firms without affecting transparent firms: 12% of transparent firms 
(15% of large firms) find that access to credit is a major obstacle to growth irrespective 
of whether these firms are located in countries where foreign banks dominate or not. 
By contrast significantly less opaque firms located in countries where domestic banks 
dominate meet major problems acceding credit (16%) than similar firms operating in 
countries where foreign banks dominate (24%). 
These figures suggest that in these countries cream skimming by foreign banks may be 
resulting indeed in the type of credit crunches expected by adverse selection models  
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such the Detriagace et.al. model reviewed above. That is, as foreign bank presence 
increases the likelihood that opaque firms meet greater credit constraints seems to rise. 
The next section explores this possibility econometrically.  
3.3  Estimation of the impact of foreign banks on credit constraints 
The point of departure is the estimation of the impact of foreign banks on the 
probability that firms' growth prospects are compromised by credit constraints. Given 
the dichotomous character of the dependent variables, the method of estimation is the 
probit model. The equation estimated is: 
1.  Pr( Credit constraint i,j = 1) =  ϕ (βο + βSmall firm + β2Transparent firm + 
β3Foreign bank sharej + β3Fij + β4Cj ) 
where ϕ is the standard normal cumulative distribution  
This equation states that the probability of firm i in country j being credit constrained 
depends on firm size, firm transparency, the share of foreign owned banks in the 
banking sector of country j, and two vectors (Fij and Cj) of other firm and country 
characteristics that may affect access to credit (All variables and their sources are 
described in table 2. Basic data is shown on table 3). Adding to 1) the interaction of 
foreign banks and firm size (transparency) brings into the analysis the marginal impact 
of foreign banks on credit access of small and opaque firms.  
If foreign banks are exogenous in 1) β3 would measure the impact of foreign banks on 
the credit constraints meet by the average firm the sample. The interaction term foreign 
banks and firm opacity, in turn, would measure the extent to which foreign bank 
presence closes or widens the credit gap between small (opaque) and larger 
(transparent) firms.  
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3.3.1  Dealing with endogeneity of foreign banks  
Foreign banks, however, need not be exogenous in models of credit allocation. 
Empirical studies have shown that in developing countries foreign bank entry indeed is 
closely correlated to the size of the financial sectors and the expected economic growth 
of host countries. According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) for example, foreign 
banks are more likely to be located in countries with shallow financial sectors and 
inefficient domestic banks where expected returns are high. Hence credit constraints 
may be a determinant of foreign bank presence rather than its consequence. In this case 
reverse causation would cause the probit estimations of 1) above to be biased.  
Endogeneity concerns are addressed in two different ways. First equations 1) is 
estimated with 3 years lagged values of foreign bank penetration; Second as robustness 
tests instrumental variables are used to identify causality.  
To instruments for foreign bank entry I use distance from Düsseldorf, in log form, and 
per capita income in 1989, also in log form. This choice of instruments is based on the 
assumption that foreign banks entered first those countries that were the most 
promising in terms of expected growth at the start of transition, and those that were 
closest, culturally and physically speaking, to the West. The above mentioned study of 
Focarelly and Pozzolo (2000) offers strong support to this hypothesis showing that 
profitability and the cultural and physical distance between home and host countries 
are important determinants of foreign bank location in developing countries. The OLS 
regression of foreign banks on these two indicators confirms the strength of the 
instruments. On their own distance from Düsseldorf and the log of per capita GDP in 
1989 explain 39% of foreign bank presence in 2004.  Both indicators are significant, at 
1% and 5 % levels of confidence, respectively.  
Foreign Banks=  4.9   - 0.34*Distance from Düsseldorf  - 0.22* GDPpc 1989 
 (4.75)  (-5.17)  (-2.14) 
R2= 0.39 
OLS regression with 22 Clusters. T-tests in parenthesis  
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Further, to be valid instruments the indicators of distance and initial levels of economic 
development must closely reflect expected growth at the start of transition but should 
not have any direct impact on current credit conditions. Various empirical papers lend 
support to this hypothesis. As Fischer (2004) and the literature reviewed therein show, 
the effect of initial conditions –main components of which are distance from the West 
and income at the start of transition- on economic growth, while strong at the 
beginning, wears off over time. Estimations of the impact of initial conditions on GDP 
growth typically show a lack of significance following the tenth year after transition 
(e.g de Melo et. al.1997).  
3.3.2  Results  
Tables 4 a) and b) present results of the basic estimations for the two indicators of 
credit constraints, access and costs. Columns 1 and 3 show results for two different 
probit estimations: in column 1 the share of foreign banks in 2004 is entered as 
explanatory variable. In column 2 the lagged value of this share, i.e. the share of 
foreign banks in 2001, is used in order to minimize endogeneity concerns. In column 3 
results with instrumental variables are presented. 
Of the firm control variables, the most important determinants of credit constraints are 
size, transparency and origin of ownership: Small firms are significantly more likely to 
find that both access to and the costs of credit are major obstacles to growth, whereas 
transparent firms and foreign-owned firms are significantly less likely to meet major 
credit constraints than opaque and domestic-owned firms. Opacity, in other words, or 
the risk attached to small domestic-owned business that cannot transmit hard 
information, seems to be the main determinant of credit constraints in this sample, with 
other variables like profitability or even relations with foreign partners playing no 
visible role in credit facilitation.   
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The importance of opacity in the determination of credit constraints is also consistent 
with the negative and significant coefficient obtained for the number of banks 
operating in the country. In line with the expectation of models of credit with 
asymmetric information, as the number of banks increases firms are more likely to 
meet major credit constraints suggesting that the expectation of long relations between 
banks and borrowers are important facilitators of credit in these countries.  
Regarding other country controls, results show that government-owned banks do not 
alleviate credit access conditions for these firms and that, on the contrary, a higher 
participation of state-owned banks is associated with more credit constraints, at least 
when the constraint is measured as access to credit. Finally, inflation and government 
debt also negatively affect credit access as previous studies of credit in transition 
countries have shown.  
Turning now to foreign bank entry, the variable of interest here, the table shows that as 
the share of foreign-owned banks increases so does the probability of a firm stating 
that access to and the cost of credit are major obstacles to growth. The negative impact 
of foreign banks on credit constraints is very large. The estimated probability of a firm 
declaring that the costs of credit are a major obstacle to growth jumps from 19%, when 
the share of foreign banks is 5%, that is in a country like Tajikistan, to 26% when the 
share is 75%, as was the case for Bulgaria in 2001. 
These results are not explained by endogeneity bias. The first step results of the IV 
probit estimations of column 3 (not shown) have an R2 of 0.70, confirming the 
strength of the instruments chosen. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test of overidentifying 
restrictions does not allow me to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the 
instruments. The Wald test of exogeneity for both IVprobit estimations (costs and 
access) support the use of the instrumental variables as does a Hausman test comparing 
the probit and the IVprobit results
2. Endogeneity, however, is not responsible for the 
                                          
2 Tests statistics are not shown but available at request  
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positive relation between foreign banks and credit constraints. If anything, the 
endogeneity bias lowers the coefficient, masking some of the impact of foreign banks 
on credit constraints. The consistent estimated coefficients of foreign banks are larger, 
positive, and significant in both equations. 
Confident that endogenity bias is not responsible for the positive association between 
foreign banks and credit constraints, and given that probit models are easier to 
manipulate than the instrumental variables models, in what follows I present results of 
probit estimations using, in order to minimize endogenity concerns, only lagged values 
of foreign bank presence. Tables 5 and 6 explore, with this methodology, the impact of 
foreign banks and of competition in the banking sector on credit constraints of firms of 
different size and levels of transparency. The tables present results for equation 1) 
estimated with foreign banks in 2001 and the number of banks in 2005 split between 
small and large (opaque and transparent) firms. Note that these interaction terms 
measure the main impact of foreign banks and competition on small and large 
(transparent and opaque) firms, not their marginal effects. For this reason there is no 
need to correct the probit coefficients. Linear tests for the equality of coefficients and 
nonlinear tests
3 for the proportionality of coefficients were applied.  
When firms are split across size an increase of foreign banks is found to result in 
higher costs of credit for small but not for large firms and to negatively affect access to 
credit for all firms, independently of size. The difference in the impact of foreign 
banks on small and large firms are significant at 1% level of confidence and there is 
strong evidence of no proportionality between coefficients. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that foreign banks affect large and small firms in different ways whereby 
small but not large firms are crowded out after foreign bank entry. Moreover, when 
firms are split along the narrower definition of transparency I find that only opaque 
                                          
3 The nonlinear tests applied are: β(smallfirms*foreign banks) * β(number banks *Large firms) = 
β(large firms*foreign banks)*β(number of banks *small firms)  
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firms are negatively affected by foreign bank entry. Transparent firms, by contrast, 
experience significantly less credit constraints as foreign banks become more 
dominant, at least when the constraint is measured as the cost of credit. Again the 
appropriate tests confirm that these differences are significant at the 1% level of 
confidence and do not depend on the proportionality of effects. Competition in the 
banking sector, by contrast, is positively related to credit constraints for all firms 
independently of size and level of transparency.  
To summarize, in transition countries foreign bank entry appears to benefit only very 
transparent firms, i.e. firms that use international accounting standards, while having a 
negative effect on the rest of firms. For the vast majority of firms in this sample 
foreign bank entry is associated with higher costs of and less access to credit.  
These results stand in sharp contrast with Clarke et. al. 2001 who, estimating basically 
the same equation on a different sample of countries, find that foreign banks and lower 
concentration rates unequivocally improve firm’s access to credit. Further, these 
authors find that their results hold independently of firm size, even if SMEs seem to 
benefit less than larger firms. In the same vein, Giannetti and Ongena (forthcoming) 
find, for a sample of 11 Eastern European countries, that foreign lending positively 
affects firm’s growth, again independently of firm size.  
My conjecture is that what explains the different results are the levels of institutional 
development which differ between this and the Clarke et. al sample, and the fact that, 
unlike Giannetti and Ongena I am analysing the impact of foreign bank entry on very 
small firms where information asymmetries can be expected to be more acute. 
Whereas Clarke et. al use a sample of middle-income countries, with which one may 
associate relatively higher levels institutional development, the BEEPS sample 
includes a large number of countries with very low levels of legal creditor protection, 
corporate governance, and law enforcement. In the case of Giannetti and Ongena, their 
study is focused on medium and large firms that submit financial data to local 
authorities and can, therefore, be expected to suffer less from any form of credit  
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rationing derived from opacity. In fact, in line with their results I find that transparent 
firms do benefit from foreign bank entry. It is opaque firms that suffer. To explore the 
validity of this assumption the next section brings into the analysis the impact of 
institutions.  
3.4  Empirical analysis of institutions  
Having established the impact of foreign banks on access to credit the second step is to 
add to the analysis the influence of economic institutions. The main hurdle to 
overcome here is to find indicators of specific economic institutions, such as the 
protection of creditor rights, that are not highly correlated with other macroeconomic 
and financial sector controls that may also affect credit conditions. This is particularly 
difficult in the case of transition countries where a large number of institutional 
reforms were launched, and are being pursued, simultaneously. To give an idea of the 
magnitude of the problem table 7 shows correlations between various indicators of 
creditor rights, the presence of foreign banks, inflation and government debt.  
Of the indicators presented in the table perhaps the most widely used proxies of 
creditor rights are the legal index of creditor rights of the World Bank, and, in the case 
of transition countries, the EBRD index of enterprise reform. The first of these two 
indexes measures the extent to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending 
in a scale that ranks countries from 1 (worst) to best (10). The second indicator ranks 
countries according to the adequacy of the written laws that affect firm governance and 
the protection of creditor rights, as well as to the effectiveness of the implementation 
of these laws. Any of these two indexes would convey the information necessary to 
test whether the protection to creditor rights affects indeed the way in which foreign 
banks operate in these countries. However, as shown in the table, the correlation of 
these two indicators with other variables in the model, and in particular with foreign 
banks, precludes their use.   
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Another good if narrower indicator would be the cost of closing a business of the 
'Doing Business' dataset of the World Bank. This index measures the time (years to 
complete proceedings), costs (in percentage of estate) and recovery (cents on the dollar 
recouped by creditors through the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings) of 
bankruptcy proceedings involving domestic entities. Although this index is, like the 
two previously discussed ones, highly correlated with foreign bank presence, two of its 
components, time and costs of proceedings, are not. Therefore I use these two indexes, 
alternatively, as proxies for protection of creditor rights.  
Based on the vast literature on law and finance (e.g. La Porta et. al 1997 and 1998; 
Galindo A. and A. Micco 2005, Gianetti, 2002 ), I expect creditor's rights to have a 
positive and direct impact on credit access. In addition, I expect them to affect credit 
access through their interaction with foreign banks.  
3.4.1  Results 
Results of estimations with institutional variables are presented in tables 8 a) and b)-. 
In line with results by previous studies I find a direct and important impact of 
economic institutions on credit constraints. These results are particularly clear in the 
equation for costs of credit. In this case, when either the costs of bankruptcy 
proceedings or the time to complete the proceedings increase, so does the likelihood 
that firms meet major credit constraints. And the effect is not negligible: As shown in 
the lower panel of table8 a) a reduction in the costs of proceedings from 42% of the 
estate, as is the case in Ukraine, to 13%, as is the case in a country like Latvia, would 
reduce the probability that an Ukrainian firm meets major credit constraints in the costs 
of credit from 45% to 22%. Similarly if the time to complete proceedings were to be 
reduced from 5.8 years, as is the case today in Belarus, to 2.8 as is the case in 
Moldova, the probability that a firm in Belarus meets major credit constraints would 
fall from 42% to 23%. These are major gains. Or, put differently: Firms in transition 
countries are paying a high price for the inefficiencies in these countries' bankruptcy 
systems.  
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The third and fourth groups of results in the tables show the same regressions with an 
indicator of general institutional development, the logarithm of per capita GDP, which 
should control for other developments, different from the efficiency of the bankruptcy 
legislation, that may affect firms' credit constraints. Clearly, economic development, or 
the concomitant institutional developments, matters. The cost of credit significantly 
falls as this indicator rises. But the specific indicators of protection of creditor rights 
remain significant even after adding this control. That is, the protection of creditor's 
rights, independently of other economic or institutional developments, affects the 
access to credit of firms. In countries where creditors rights are weakly protected, firms 
have less access to credit and are also more likely to find that the costs of credit 
constitute a major obstacle to growth.  
But, does the protection of creditor's rights also influence the way in which foreign 
banks affect access to credit and its costs? Results presented in table 9 a) and b) show 
that this is indeed the case. The table presents the corrected interaction terms
4 between 
foreign banks and the costs of bankruptcy proceedings and between foreign banks and 
the time to complete proceedings. In the case of the costs of credit both interaction 
terms are positive and significant for all observation in the sample. In other words, 
inefficiencies in bankruptcy proceedings not only have a direct negative impact on 
credit access, they also affect firms through their interaction with foreign banks. As 
bankruptcy proceedings become lengthier and more costly, the negative impact of 
foreign banks on the costs of credit becomes more pronounced. In the case of access to 
credit, institutional variables appear to be of lesser importance.  
                                          
4 The coefficients of the probit interaction terms were corrected with the Norton's 'inteff'  estimation 
procedure for STATA.  
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4  Conclusions 
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of the influence of economic 
institutions on the effect of foreign banks on credit access. Working on a sample of 
mainly small and opaque firms in 22 transition economies I find that in these countries 
only very transparent firms have benefited from foreign bank entry. For large numbers 
of small and opaque firms foreign bank entry has resulted in less and more costly 
commercial loans. I present strong evidence that these results can be explained by the 
type of economic institutions that prevail in these countries. In particular, I show that 
the negative impact of foreign banks on the costs of credit increases significantly with 
the worsening of the legal environment, characterised by lengthy and expensive 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
These results suggest that pooling data of countries with different legal environments 
can be misleading. What obtains for rich and middle income countries, with 
presumably better legal systems, does not necessarily apply to low income countries 
where economic institutions are weaker.  
For poor countries, the policy implications of these results are important. 
Strengthening the financial sector via foreign bank entry is likely to be harmful to large 
numbers of firms if it is not accompanied by the required upgrading of their legal 
systems.   
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Table 1: Distribution of firms with credit constraints by size and transparency 
 
   Credit  constraint 
   Cost    Access 











In rest of 







In rest of 
countries 
              
Opaque  firms  5140  26% 30% 22%    20% 24% 16% 
Transparent firms  1049  17% 16% 22%    12% 12% 12% 
             
             
Small  firms  4494  27% 30% 22%    20% 23% 16% 
Large firms  1695  20%  19%  21%     15%  16%  14% 
             
Small firms are firms of less than 50 employees. Transparent firms are firms with international accounting 
standards. Countries where foreign banks dominate are those where foreign banks own more than 50% of bank 
assets.  
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Table 2 Definition of variables, expected sings and sources 
Variable  Definition and expected signs  Source 
Main determinants of credit constraints 
Firm size:   Dummy. Small firms (1) are firms with 
fewer than 50 employees. (+) 
BEEPS 
Firm transparency  Dummy: Transparent firms (1) are firms 
with international accounting standards. 
(-) 
BEEPS 
Foreign bank ownership. I   Assets share of foreign owned banks in 
percent. in 2001 and in 2004. (?) 
For the 2004 figure 
EBRD. For the 2001 
figure, World Bank 
database on bank 
supervision. 
Firm-level controls 
Profitability   Ratio of gross profits to total sales in 
1998/1999. (-) 
BEEPS 
Foreign-owned firm  
 
Share of firm assets in foreign hands. 
These firms are expected to have more 




Share of exports in total sales. Since 
commercial relationships with firms 
located abroad normally involve bank 
transactions, firms that engage in these 
activities are more likely to cultivate their 
relationships with banks and have, as a 
result, better access to credit.  (-) 
BEEPS 
Country-level controls 
Competition in the banking 
sector  
 
Number of banks operating in each country 
in 2004.. Competition should improve access 
if information is perfect. If relationship 
lending is important competition would 
increase credit constraints. (?) 
EBRD 
Government-owned banks   Share of banking sector assets controlled by 
banks with at least 51% state ownership in 
2004. (+). 
EBRD 
Inflation   Average CPI inflation 2002-2004. (+).  IFS 
Government Debt   Percentage of GDP in 2004. (+)   EBRD  
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banks  Inflation 
Gov.
debt  
              
Albania  184 76% 14% 21%  7% 14% 93%  7%  16  4%  56% 
Armenia  332 81% 31% 21%  6%  7% 57%  0%  20  4%  33% 
Azerbaijan  259  71% 8%  24%  12% 4% 6%  56%  44  4%  19% 
Belarus  255 74%  2% 20%  8% 10% 20% 70%  32  30% 9% 
Bulgaria  244 75% 24% 21%  9%  9% 82%  2%  35  5%  41% 
Croatia  152 62% 61% 21% 10% 14% 91%  3%  37  2%  44% 
Czech Rep  296  78%  5%  24%  8% 9%  85% 3%  35  2%  31% 
Estonia  139 73% 83% 23% 15% 11% 98%  0%  9  3% 6% 
Georgia  147 77% 39% 24% 11%  7% 58%  0%  21  5%  47% 
Hungary  410 74% 13% 23% 12% 14% 63%  7%  38  6%  57% 
Kazakhstan 510  72%  8%  20%  8% 4% 6% 4%  35  6%  11% 
Kyrgyzstan  176 66% 42% 20% 10%  9% 70%  4%  19  5%  94% 
Latvia  137 77% 25% 23%  8%  9% 49%  4%  23  4%  15% 
Lithuania  146 68% 19% 20% 11% 14% 91%  0%  12  0%  20% 
Macedonia  155 75% 15% 23%  8% 10% 47%  2%  21  1%  44% 
Moldova  266 69%  9% 23%  9% 11% 34% 18%  16  10%  46% 
Poland  865  75% 7%  23% 5% 8%  71%  19%  57  2%  42% 
Romania  478 66% 23% 27%  7% 10% 59%  8%  32  17%  19% 
Slovak  Rep  151 72%  8% 20%  9% 10% 97%  1%  21  6%  42% 
Slovenia  194 71% 18% 25%  8% 21% 20% 13%  22  6%  29% 
Tajikistan  187  61% 5%  21% 8% 7% 6%  12%  12 12%  39% 
Ukraine  506 74% 11% 23%  8%  6% 12%  8%  160  5%  26% 
For sources and definitions see table 2 
  
 Table 4 a): Impact of foreign banks on credit constraints: Dependent variable is cost of credit 
1) Probit regression. Foreign banks is the share of foreign-owned bank assets in 2004. 2) Probit regression with foreignbanks lagged 3 years. 3) IV probit regression. Foreign 
banks in 2004 are instrumented with the logarithms of distance from Düsseldorf and per capita income in 1989 plus all other exogenous variables. * denotes significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level of confidence. 
  1) 2) 3) 
                             
Financial sector indicators                
Foreign  banks  0.224 (0.075)  ***  0.315 (0.069)  ***  0.363 (0.102)  *** 
State-owned  banks  2004  0.093 (0.129)    0.096 (0.129)    0.135 (0.138)   
Number  of  banks  2004  0.005 (0.001)  ***  0.006 (0.000)  ***  0.006 (0.001)  *** 
Firm controls                
Small  firm  dummy  0.136 (0.043)  ***  0.134 (0.044)  ***  0.132 (0.044)  *** 
Transparent  firm  dummy  -0.202 (0.054)  ***  -0.192 (0.054)  ***  -0.212 (0.054)  *** 
Profit  margins  2004  0.000 (0.001)    0.000 (0.001)    0.000 (0.001)   
Foreign -owned firm (share ownership 2004)  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  *** 
Exports (% over total sales 2004)  0.000  (0.001)    0.000  (0.001)    0.000  (0.001)   
Macro controls                
Inflation    (average  2002-2004)  1.022 (0.361)  ***  1.232 (0.365)  ***  1.175 (0.381)  *** 
Government  debt  (2004)  1.168 (0.111)  ***  1.238 (0.107)  ***  1.120 (0.119)  *** 
Constant -1.551  (0.089)  ***  -1.638 (0.091)  ***  -1.631 (0.098)  *** 
                
Number of obs   =  6189      6189      6189     
Wald chi2(10)   =  294.12      302.54      288.56     
Prob > chi2     =  0      0      0     
Pseudo R2       =  0.0442        0.0457        0       
 
Probability of credit constraints associated with different levels of foreign bank penetration (based on col. 2) 
Foreign bank share  Associated probability         
5% 19%        
50% 23%        
75% 26%         
  1 
Table 4 b): Impact of foreign banks on credit constraints: Dependent variable is access to credit 
1) Probit regression. Foreign banks is the share of foreign-owned bank assets in 2004. 2) Probit regression with foreignbanks lagged 3 years. 3) IV probit regression. Foreign 
banks in 2004 are instrumented with the logarithms of distance from Düsseldorf and per capita income in 1989 plus all other exogenous variables. * denotes significance at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level of confidence. 
   1)      2)      3)     
Financial sector indicators                 
Foreign banks  0.533  (0.080)  ***  0.574  (0.074)  ***  0.648  (0.110)  *** 
State-owned banks 2004  0.582  (0.137)  ***  0.558  (0.138)  ***  0.623  (0.143)  *** 
Number of banks 2004  0.005  (0.001)  ***  0.005  (0.001)  ***  0.005  (0.001)  *** 
Firm controls                 
Small firm dummy  0.107  (0.046)  **  0.105  (0.047)  **  0.104  (0.047)  ** 
Transparent firm dummy  -0.260  (0.059)  ***  -0.236  (0.059)  ***  -0.268  (0.059)  *** 
Profit margins 2004  -0.001  (0.001)    -0.001 (0.001)    -0.001  (0.001)   
Foreign -owned firm (share ownership 2004)  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  *** 
Exports (% over total sales 2004)  0.000  (0.001)    0.000  (0.001)    0.000  (0.001)   
Macro controls                 
Inflation  (average 2002-2004)  1.089  (0.375)  ***  1.316  (0.385)  ***  1.210  (0.392)  *** 
Government debt (2004)  0.673  (0.116)  ***  0.842  (0.114)  ***  0.630  (0.128)  *** 
Constant -1.746  (0.096)  ***  -1.830 (0.098) ***  -1.812  (0.106)  *** 
                  
Number of obs   =  6189      6189      6189     
Wald chi2(10)   =  216.95      227.12      201.54     
Prob > chi2     =  0      0      0     
Pseudo R2       =  0.0384        0.0407                
 
Probability of credit constraints associated with different levels of foreign bank penetration (based on col. 2) 
Foreign bank share  Associated probability           
5% 11%          
50% 17%          
75% 25%          Table 5 Impact of foreign banks and concentration on credit constraints of firms by size 
Probit regression including the same explanatory variabes as in table 4; *  denotes significance at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** at 1% levels of confidence. 
   Cost  Access 
   Coef.  Std. Err     Coef.  Std. Err    
            
Foreign banks  2001* small firm  0.355  (0.079)  ***  0.619  (0.084)  *** 
Foreign banks 2001 * large firm  0.187  (0.124)    0.434  (0.133)  *** 
Number of banks * small firm  0.005  (0.001)  ***  0.004  (0.001)  *** 
Number of banks * large firm  0.008  (0.001)  ***  0.007  (0.001)  *** 
            
Small firm  0.270  (0.066)  ***  0.204  (0.070)  ** 
            
Constant -1.594  (0.088)  ***  -1.633  (0.093)  *** 
                    
Number of obs   =  6189      6189     
Wald chi2(10)   =  309.36      232.65     
Prob > chi2     =  0      0     
Pseudo R2       =  0.0475        0.0419       
 
Table 6 Impact of foreign banks and concentration on credit constraints of firms by transparency 
Probit regression including the same explanatory variabes as in table 4; *  denotes significance at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** at 1% levels of confidence. 
   Cost  Access 
   Coef.  Std. Err     Coef.  Std. Err    
            
Foreign banks  2001* transparent firm  -0.360  (0.175)  **  -0.151  (0.188)   
Foreign banks 2001 * opaque firm  0.440  (0.075)  ***  0.701  (0.080)  *** 
Number of banks * transparent firm  0.006  (0.001)  ***  0.005  (0.001)  *** 
Number of banks * opaque firm  0.006  (0.001)  ***  0.005  (0.001)  *** 
            
Transparent firm  -0.151  (0.081)  *  -0.213  (0.088)  ** 
Small firm  0.134  (0.044)  ***  0.106  (0.047)  ** 
            
Constant -1.446  (0.080)  ***  -1.506  (0.085)  *** 
                    
Number of obs   =  6189      6189     
Wald chi2(10)   =  327.38      248.17     
Prob > chi2     =  0      0     
Pseudo R2       =  0.0485        0.0441       
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Table 7 Correlation coefficients legal indicators and country-level variables 
        'Doing  Business'  indicators 
           'Closing  business' 













rights  Index Years    Cost. Recov. 
              
 Foreign 
banks 2004 
1            
 Foreign 
banks 2001 
0.92  1          
  Inflation    -0.46  -0.44  1         








-0.53 -0.45  0.25 -0.01 -0.31  1         
Composite 
index 




-0.24 -0.30  0.63 -0.45 -0.59 -0.06  0.31  1     
Cost of 
procedure 




















Recovery  0.46  0.54 -0.24  0.11  0.39 -0.36 -1.00 -0.32 -0.76  1 
  
Table 8a) Impact of institutions on credit constraints: Dependent variable is cost of credit. Probit regressions             
 Coeff.  Std. 
error 
   Coeff.  Std. 
error 
   Coeff.  Std. 
error 
   Coeff.  Std. 
error 
  
Indicator of creditor rights                     
Log(per  capita  GDP)            -0.056  (0.030)  *  -0.013  (0.030)   
Cost of proceedings (% of estate)  0.019  (0.006)  ***        0.022  (0.006)  ***     
Years to complete proceedings        0.177  (0.041)  ***        0.176 (0.041) *** 
Financial sector indicators                     
Foreign  banks  2001  0.273 (0.088) ***  0.299 (0.085) ***  0.430 (0.120) ***  0.340 (0.124) *** 
State-owned banks 2004  -0.220  (0.144)    -0.339 (0.149)   -0.204 (0.145)   -0.327 (0.151) ** 
Number  of  banks  2004  0.001 (0.001)   0.005 (0.001) ***  0.000 (0.002)   0.005 (0.001) *** 
Firm controls                     
Small  firm  dummy  0.131 (0.047) ***  0.125 (0.047) ***  0.131 (0.047) ***  0.125 (0.047) *** 
Transparent  firm  dummy  -0.199 (0.061) ***  -0.238 (0.061) ***  -0.206 (0.061) ***  -0.241 (0.061) *** 
Profit margins 2004  -0.001  (0.001)    -0.001  (0.001)   0.000 (0.001)   -0.001 (0.001)  
Foreign -owned firm (share ownership 2004)  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  ***  -0.005  (0.001)  *** 
Exports (% over total sales 2004)  -0.001  (0.001)    -0.001 (0.001)   -0.001 (0.001)   -0.001 (0.001)  
Macro controls                     
Inflation    (average  2002-2004)  1.517 (0.399) ***  0.519 (0.484)   1.366 (0.412) ***  0.491 (0.484)  
Government  debt  (2004)  1.642 (0.158) ***  1.786 (0.166) ***  1.543 (0.162) ***  1.758 (0.173) *** 
Constant  -1.751 (0.095) ***  -2.128 (0.136) ***  -1.748 (0.095) ***  -2.123 (0.136) *** 
                     
Number  of  obs  5227     5227     5227     5227    
Wald  chi2(11)  337.91     336.05     338.88     336.05    
Prob  >  chi2  0     0     0     0    
Pseudo R2  0.0592        0.0602        0.0598        0.0602       
Impact of improvements of creditor rights on the predicted probability that the cost of credit is a major obstacle to firm growth, based on columns 7 and 9 
                   
  Cost of proceedings    Years to complete 
proceedings 
    
Improvement  42  13  4   5.8  2.8 1.7          
Predicted probability  0.45  0.22  0.16     0.42  0.23  0.18                
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Table 8b) Impact of institutions on credit constraints: Dependent variable is access to credit Probit regressions 
 Coeff.  Std. 
error 
   Coeff.  Std. 
error 
   Coeff.  Std. error     Coeff.  Std. error    
Indicator of creditor rights                      
Log(per  capita  GDP)           0.042  (0.032)    0.032  (0.032)   
Cost of proceedings (% of estate)  0.006  (0.006)                0.004  (0.006)   
Years to complete proceedings        0.108  (0.045)  **  0.110  (0.045)  **       
Financial sector indicators                      
Foreign  banks  2001  0.577  (0.097) ***  0.562  (0.094) ***  0.431  (0.135) ***  0.490  (0.129) *** 
State-owned  banks  2004  0.423  (0.147) ***  0.291  (0.159) *  0.255  (0.163)   0.415  (0.148) *** 
Number  of  banks  2004  0.003  (0.002) **  0.005  (0.001) ***  0.004  (0.001) ***  0.004  (0.002) ** 
Firm controls                      
Small  firm  dummy  0.108  (0.051) **  0.108  (0.051) **  0.109  (0.051) **  0.109  (0.051) ** 
Transparent  firm  dummy  -0.271  (0.067) ***  -0.287  (0.067) ***  -0.279  (0.067) ***  -0.267  (0.067) *** 
Profit margins 2004  -0.002  (0.001)    -0.002  (0.001)   -0.002  (0.001)   -0.002  (0.001)  
Foreign  -owned  firm  (share  ownership  2004)  -0.005  (0.001) ***  -0.005  (0.001) ***  -0.005  (0.001) ***  -0.005  (0.001) *** 
Exports  (%  over  total  sales  2004)  0.000  (0.001)   0.000  (0.001)   0.000  (0.001)   0.000  (0.001)  
Macro controls                      
Inflation    (average  2002-2004)  1.577  (0.413) ***  0.924  (0.514) *  0.996  (0.513) *  1.661  (0.422) *** 
Government  debt  (2004)  1.052  (0.169) ***  1.168  (0.180) ***  1.248  (0.192) ***  1.103  (0.177) *** 
Constant -1.878  (0.101)  ***  -2.123  (0.146)  ***  -2.136 (0.147)  ***  -1.880 (0.101)  *** 
                      
Number  of  obs  5227     5227     5227     5227    
Wald  chi2(11)  245.07     249.08     251.67     246.86    
Prob > chi2  0      0      0      0    
Pseudo R2  0.0506        0.0516        0.0519        0.0508       
Impact of improvements of creditor rights on thepredicted probability that access to credit is a major obstacle to firm growth, based on columns 7 and 9 
                      
  Cost of proceedings    Years to complete 
proceedings 
        
Improvement  42 15  4    5.8  2.9  1.7           
Predicted probability  0.20  0.18  0.17     0.27  0.17  0.14                
  
Table 9 a) Interaction effect of foreign banks and institutions on credit constraints 
Dependent variable is cost of credit 
Corrected interaction term Foreign banks* Institutions. Stata estimation with 'inteff'. Based on the 
following probit regressions: Pr ( Credit constraint i,j = 1) =  j (bo + b1institution indicator 
+b2Foreign bank sharej +  b3Institutions indicator*Foreign bank sharej +b4Fij +b5Cj  )) where firm 
controls (Fij) and country level controls (Cj) are the same as in table 2 
 
   Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs 
Foreign banks* cost of proceedings       
       
Corrected  coefficent  0.019 0.005 0.003 0.026  5227 
Standard  error  0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006  5227 
z  statistic  4.382 0.559 2.521 5.950  5227 
       
Foreign banks* time to complete proceedings       
Corrected  coefficent  0.091 0.022 0.014 0.117  5227 
Standard  error  0.041 0.012 0.005 0.057  5227 
z  statistic  2.284 0.256 1.976 3.459  5227 
 
 
Table 9 b) Interaction effect of foreign banks and institutions on credit constraints 
Dependent variable is access to credit  
Corrected interaction term Foreign banks* Institutions. Stata estimation with 'inteff'. Based on the 
following probit regressions: Pr ( Credit constraint i,j = 1) =  j (bo + b1institution indicator 
+b2Foreign bank sharej +  b3Institutions indicator*Foreign bank sharej +b4Fij +b5Cj  )) where firm 
controls (Fij) and country level controls (Cj) are the same as in table 2 
   Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs 
Foreign banks* cost of proceedings       
       
Corrected  coefficent  0.018 0.008  -0.004 0.031 5227
Standard  error  0.004 0.002 0.001 0.007 5227
z  statistic  4.346 1.170  -0.819 7.343 5227
       
Foreign banks* time to complete proceedings       
Corrected  coefficent  0.047 0.013 0.008 0.065  5227 
Standard  error  0.037 0.014 0.004 0.059  5227 
z  statistic  1.362 0.216 1.100 2.140  5227 
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